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I. Introduction	  
 The	  United	  States’	  judicial	  system	  maintains	  the	  long	  held	  belief	  that	  one	  is	  innocent	  until	  proven	  guilty	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  is	  an	  incredible	  tool	  that	  exists	  to	  protect	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  United	  States	  from	  unlawful	  searches	  and	  seizures,	  and	  grants	  them	  privacy	  from	  prying	  eyes	  and	  ears.	  The	  founding	  fathers	  felt	   it	   important	  enough	  to	  explicitly	   remind	   Americans	   that	   they	   have	   the	   right	   to	   feel	   safe	   and	   secure	   in	   their	  persons,	   houses,	   papers,	   and	   effects.	   The	   Fourth	   Amendment	   has	   been	   applied	   in	   a	  multitude	  of	  cases	  revolving	  around	  physical	  evidence.	  Recently,	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  technology,	  privacy	   has	   become	  more	   difficult	   to	   obtain.	   The	   emergence	   of	   digital	   data	   has	   created	  confusing	  and	  complicated	  new	  discourse	  as	  to	  how	  this	  necessary	  amendment	  should	  be	  applied	  and	   interpreted.	  When	  a	  cell	  phone	   is	   seized	   through	  a	  search	  warrant,	   just	  how	  much	  of	   the	  cellphone	  can	  be	  searched?	  What	  about	  a	  computer,	  or	  a	  hard	  drive?	   Just	  as	  this	   amendment	   had	   to	   be	   reconstructed	   when	   dealing	   with	   automobiles,	   it	   is	   time	   to	  reimagine	  how	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  applies	  to	  the	  digital	  world	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  ever-­‐growing	  user	  population. I	   plan	   on	   approaching	   this	   topic	   by	   studying	   various	   court	   cases	   surrounding	   the	  Fourth	   Amendment,	   and	   using	   the	   various	   corresponding	   doctrines	   and	   precedents	   to	  argue	   that	   even	   though	   digital	   data	   is	   more	   compact	   than	   physical	   data,	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment	  still	  protects	   individuals	   from	  unlawful	  searches	  and	  seizures.	  The	  goal	   is	   to	  define	  and	  decide	  where	  the	  lines	  can	  be	  drawn	  during	  searches	  of	  digital	  data.	   Today,	  information	  can	  be	  obtained	  instantaneously.	  We	  live	  in	  the	  information	  age	  where	   data	   has	   no	   bounds.	   Our	   access	   to	   data	   is	   also	   becoming	   infinite,	   as	   we	   have	   an	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increasing	  amount	  of	  ways	  to	  “plug	  in”.	  Our	  phones,	  computers,	  and	  even	  watches	  are	  able	  to	   access	   and	   store	   data.	   Social	  media	   has	  made	   it	   possible	   to	   be	   virtually	   connected	   to	  people	  all	  across	  the	  world	  with	  ease.	  With	  platforms	  like	  Facebook,	  Google,	  and	  Snapchat,	  the	   line	   between	  what’s	   private	   and	   public	   is	   constantly	   being	   blurred	   and	   re-­‐drawn.	   A	  single	   Facebook	   profile	   holds	   information	   like	   your	   full	   name,	   date	   of	   birth,	   gender,	  address,	  photos	  of	  you,	  and	  more.	  The	  Internet	  holds	  virtual	  versions	  of	  millions	  of	  us.	  With	  our	  technology	  advancing	  at	  an	  incredible	  rate,	  it’s	  alarming	  that	  our	  laws	  are	  stagnant	  and	  not	  evolving.	  	   Though	  our	   laws	  have	  not	   yet	   changed,	   there	  have	  been	   increasing	   conversations	  around	  how	  they	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  technology.	  Over	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  new	  technology	  has	   seamlessly	   eased	   into	   our	   lives,	   with	   the	   potential	   dangers	   and	   repercussions	   only	  becoming	  evident	  now.	  Computer	  searches	  are	  drastically	  different	  from	  physical	  searches	  of	  homes.	  A	  home,	  however	  big	  it	  is,	  can	  only	  hold	  so	  much	  information.	  It	  can	  only	  hold	  so	  many	  letters,	  books,	  and	  photos.	  A	  computer,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  compact	  while	  also	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  hold	  terabytes	  of	  data.	  A	  terabyte	  is	  hard	  to	  fathom,	  so	  here	  are	  some	  quick	   facts:	   If	  all	  of	   the	  17	  million	  books	  and	  documents	   in	   the	  Library	  of	  Congress	  were	  digitized,	  they	  would	  take	  up	  136	  terabytes	  of	  information.	  A	  single	  terabyte	  can	  hold	  about	  330,000	   photos,	   1000	   hours	   of	   video,	   or	   250,000	  mp3	   files	   (which	  would	   be	   about	   two	  years	   of	   continuous	   music).1	  All	   of	   this	   information	   can	   be	   stored	   on	   a	   small	   portable	  device,	   but	   very	   difficult	   to	   store	   in	   your	   house.	   This	   is	   why	   searching	   a	   computer	   is	  inherently	  very	  different	  from	  searching	  anything	  else—the	  access	  to	  an	  incredible	  amount	  of	  information.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Rosberg,	  2008	  	  2	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	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Consider	  the	  case	  of	   the	  terrorist	  owned	  Apple	   iPhone	  that	  was	  obtained	  after	  the	  San	  Bernadino	  terrorist	  attack.	  The	  FBI	  wanted	  to	  search	  the	  phone	  so	  they	  attempted	  to	  force	   Apple	   to	   create	   a	   backdoor	   to	   their	   encryption.	   This	   led	   to	   a	   national	   discussion	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  privacy	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  government	  have	  the	  right	  to	  access	  your	  personal	   information.	  With	   the	  ability	   to	   store	   large	  amounts	  of	  data,	   how	   should	   a	  computer	   be	   searched	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment?	   In	   order	   to	  protect	  what	  little	   privacy	   we	   have,	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   must	   be	   reevaluated	   when	   dealing	   with	  computer	  searches,	  as	  the	  protection	  offered	  should	  not	  only	  apply	  to	  tangible	  objects	  but	  also	  to	  information	  and	  data	  that	  can	  be	  digitally	  stored.	   The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  defines	  “computer”	  as:	   An	   electronic	   device	   (or	   system	   of	   devices)	   which	   is	   used	   to	   store,	  manipulate,	  and	  communicate	  information,	  perform	  complex	  calculations,	  or	  control	   or	   regulate	   other	   devices	   or	   machines,	   and	   is	   capable	   of	   receiving	  information	   (data)	   and	   of	   processing	   it	   in	   accordance	   with	   variable	  procedural	   instructions	   (programs	  or	  software);	  esp.	   a	   small,	   self-­‐contained	  one	  for	  individual	  use	  in	  the	  home	  or	  workplace,	  used	  esp.	  for	  handling	  text,	  images,	  music,	   and	   video,	   accessing	   and	  using	   the	   Internet,	   communicating	  with	  other	  people	  (e.g.	  by	  means	  of	  email),	  and	  playing	  games.2 Given	  this	  definition,	  it’s	  accurate	  to	  consider	  that	  a	  computer	  qualifies	  as	  any	  data-­‐storing	  device.	  This	   extends	   to	   smartphones,	   tablets,	   and	  even	   smart	  watches.	  When	  mentioning	  computers	  in	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  be	  referencing	  all	  of	  the	  qualifying	  devices	  as	  well.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	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   The	  concept	  of	  privacy	  is	  most	  heavily	  protected	  under	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.	  The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  reads:	   “The	  right	  of	   the	  people	   to	  be	  secure	   in	   their	  persons,	  houses,	  papers,	  and	  effects,	  against	  unreasonable	  searches	  and	  seizures,	  shall	  not	  be	  violated,	  and	  no	  Warrants	  shall	   issue,	  but	  upon	  probable	  cause,	   supported	  by	  Oath	  or	  affirmation,	  and	  particularly	  describing	  the	  place	  to	  be	  searched,	  and	  the	  persons	  or	  things	  to	  be	  searched.”	  
3Past	   cases	   have	   depicted	   this	   right	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   searching	   homes	   and	   private	  property.	   However,	   this	   amendment	   has	   had	   to	   be	   reevaluated	   when	   dealing	   with	   new	  technologies	   before.	   Automobiles	   provide	   a	   demonstration	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	  extending	  beyond	  a	  physical	  home	  or	  building.	   The	  concept	  of	  “know	  your	  rights”	  seems	  naive,	  but	  it’s	  incredibly	  important.	  Time	  and	  time	  again,	   individuals	  have	  demonstrated	  that	   they	  were	  not	  aware	  they	  had	  rights.	  Rights	   like	   that	   of	   an	   attorney	   being	   present	   during	   questioning,	   or	   the	   right	   to	   see	   a	  warrant	  before	   a	   search	   takes	  place.	  Media	  plays	   an	   important	   role	  here,	   as	  media	  often	  reaches	  a	   further	  audience	  than	  court	  case	  proceedings	  do.	  For	  example,	   Jay-­‐Z’s	  song	  “99	  Problems”	  featured	  a	  verse	  that	  alluded	  to	  a	  police	  encounter.	  The	  lyrics	  were	  a	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  Jay-­‐Z	  and	  the	  police	  officer	  that	  pulled	  him	  over.	  The	  verse	  is:	   "Do	  you	  mind	  if	  I	  look	  round	  the	  car	  a	  little	  bit? Well	  my	  glove	  compartment	  is	  locked	  so	  is	  the	  trunk	  and	  the	  back And	  I	  know	  my	  rights	  so	  you	  gon'	  need	  a	  warrant	  for	  that” The	  popularity	  of	  this	  song	  served	  to	  inform	  many	  young	  individuals	  of	  their	  rights,	  though	  Saint	  Louis	  University	  School	  of	  Law’s	  Professor	  Caleb	  Mason	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  U.S.	  Const.,	  amend.	  IV.	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warrant	  requirement	  for	  car	  searches	  because	  cars	  are	  inherently	  mobile.4	  	  However,	  it	  is	  necessary	   for	  probable	   cause	   to	  be	  present.5	  With	   technology	   that	   allows	  us	   to	   store	  our	  personal	   data	   on	   everyday	   devices,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   we	   not	   just	   rely	   on	  mainstream	  media	  to	  educate	  us.	  The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  extends	  beyond	  personal	  property	  to	  include	  “papers”	   and	   “effects”	   and	   today	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   assume	   that	   computers	   fall	   under	   these	  categories. 
 	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Carroll	  v.	  United	  States	  5	  Mason,	  2011	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II. 	  History	  &	  Origin	  
 The	  creation	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  originated	  from	  the	  negative	  experiences	  of	  colonists	   under	   the	   King.	   In	   order	   to	   enforce	   taxes	   and	   revenue	   laws,	   the	   “English	  authorities	  made	  use	  of	  writs	  of	  assistance”,	  which	  were	  general	  warrants	  authorizing	  the	  bearer	   to	   enter	   any	   house	   or	   other	   place	   to	   search	   for	   and	   seize	   “prohibited	   and	  uncustomed”	   goods,	   and	   commanding	   all	   subjects	   to	   assist	   in	   these	   endeavors.6	  	   These	  writs	  of	  assistance	  were	  applicable	  not	  only	   for	   the	  remainder	  of	   the	  sovereign’s	   life,	  but	  also	   for	   six	   additional	   months.	   These	   unreasonable	   timeframes	   and	   procedures	   offered	  colonists	   minimal	   protection	   from	   the	   crown.	   John	   Adams	   heard	   a	   patriot,	   James	   Otis,	  speak	   out	   against	   these	   writs	   of	   assistance	   in	   1761,	   and	   later	   wrote,	   “[e]very	   man	   of	   a	  crowded	  audience	  appeared	  to	  me	  to	  go	  away,	  as	  I	  did,	  ready	  to	  take	  arms	  against	  writs	  of	  assistance.”	   According	   to	   Adams,	   Otis’s	   speech	   was	   “the	   first	   scene	   of	   the	   first	   act	   of	  opposition	  to	  the	  arbitrary	  claims	  of	  Great	  Britain.	  Then	  and	  there	  the	  child	  Independence	  was	  born.”7	   It’s	   necessary	   to	   draw	   comparisons	   between	   the	   types	   of	   information	   that	   could	  have	  been	  searched	  for	  and	  seized	  in	  the	  1700s	  and	  the	  type	  of	  information	  we	  own	  today.	  Though	  the	  containers	  of	  the	  information	  have	  changed	  drastically,	  the	  content	  has	  not.	  	  In	  the	  court	  case	  Riley	  V	  California,	   Justice	  Roberts	  noted	  that	  “the	  fact	  that	  technology	  now	  allows	  an	  individual	  to	  carry	  such	  information	  in	  his	  hand	  does	  not	  make	  the	  information	  any	   less	   worthy	   of	   the	   protection	   for	   which	   the	   Founders	   fought.”8	  Keeping	   this	   idea	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Justia	  Law	  7	  10	  Works	  of	  John	  Adams	  	  8	  Riley	  v.	  California	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mind,	   it’s	   fair	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   information	   stored	   in	   devices	   like	   our	   phones	   and	  computers	   need	   to	   be	   protected	   as	   strictly	   as	   information	   stored	   physically.	   The	   Fourth	  Amendment	   is	   centered	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   protection	   and	   privacy,	   and	   this	   needs	   to	   be	  restructured	  to	  fit	  our	  present	  day	  technological	  capabilities.	   
 	   	  
	   9	  
III. Existing	  Legal	  Background	  
 There	   are	   several	   key	   court	   cases	   that	   help	   address	   the	   issues	   presented	   in	   this	  paper.	  These	  cases	  provide	  instrumental	  information	  and	  set	  important	  precedents	  in	  this	  area	  of	  law.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  cases	  is	  Riley	  v.	  California.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  defendant	  David	  Leon	  Riley	  was	  pulled	  over	  for	  driving	  with	  expired	  license	  registration	  tags.	  After	  realizing	  Riley	  was	  also	  driving	  with	  a	  suspended	  driver’s	  license,	  the	  police	  required	  the	  car	  to	  be	  impounded.	  It	  is	  procedure	  to	  perform	  an	  inventory	  search	  before	  the	  car	  is	  impounded	  to	  protect	   against	   potential	   liability	   claims	   and	   to	   discover	   hidden	   contraband.	   The	   search	  resulted	  in	  the	  discovery	  of	  two	  guns,	  which	  then	  led	  to	  Riley’s	  arrest	  for	  the	  possession	  of	  firearms.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  arrest,	  Riley	  had	  his	  cell	  phone	  in	  his	  pocket,	  and	  it	  was	  collected	  due	  to	  the	  search	  incident	  to	  arrest	  principle.	  The	  police	  then	  searched	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  phone	  and	   found	  photos	   and	  videos	   associating	  Riley	  with	   a	  Gang,	  which	   led	  Riley	   to	  be	  linked	  with	  a	  gang	  related	  shooting	  that	  had	  occurred	  earlier	  that	  month.	  This	  link	  allowed	  Riley	   to	   then	   be	   charged	   for	   that	   crime,	  which	   included	   shooting	   at	   an	   occupied	   vehicle,	  attempted	  murder,	  and	  assault	  with	  a	  semi-­‐automatic	  firearm.	  Riley	  attempted	  to	  suppress	  the	   evidence	   surrounding	   his	   gang	   association	   because	   it	   was	   required	   through	   his	   cell	  phone,	  however	  this	  motion	  was	  denied	  and	  a	  jury	  convicted	  Riley	  of	  all	  three	  counts.	  Riley	  was	  then	  handed	  a	  sentence	  of	  fifteen	  years	  to	  life	  in	  prison.9 Upon	   appeal,	   the	   United	   States	   Supreme	   Court	   faced	   an	   intriguing	   question	   that	  forced	   them	   to	   examine	  new	   technology	   through	  a	   constitutional	   lens:	  Was	   the	   evidence	  admitted	   at	   trial	   from	   Riley’s	   cell	   phone	   discovered	   through	   a	   search	   that	   violated	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Oyez,	  Riley	  v.	  California	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Fourth	  Amendment	  right	  to	  be	  free	  from	  unreasonable	  searches?	  (ibid.)	  	  The	  answer	  is,	  yes.	  The	   detective	   who	   searched	   Riley’s	   phone	   testified	   that	   he	   “went	   through”	   his	   phone	  “looking	   for	   evidence,	   because...gang	  members	  will	   often	   video	   themselves	  with	   guns	   or	  take	   pictures	   of	   themselves	   with	   guns.”10	  This	   search	   could	   be	   equivalent	   to	   a	   detective	  entering	   a	   house	   belonging	   to	   someone	   who	   was	   found	   with	   marijuana	   and	   then	  proceeding	   to	   search	   for	   marijuana	   plants	   because	   sometimes	   people	   grow	   their	   own	  product.	  This	  is	  an	  incredibly	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  search	  incident	  to	  arrest	  can	  be	  applied.	   The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  was	  created	  with	  the	  technology	  of	  the	  1700s	  in	  mind.	  The	  founding	  fathers	  could	  not	  have	  predicted	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  technological	  age	  and	  the	  progress	  we	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  make	  in	  such	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  However,	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  brought	  about	  new	  technologies	  such	  as	  the	  car,	  which	   introduced	  new	  places	  that	   could	  be	   searched.	  The	  next	   case	   that	   changed	   the	  way	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  was	  applied	  was	  Carroll	  v.	  United	  States.	  This	  1925	  case	  was	  the	  first	  to	  address	  how	  searches	  and	   warrants	   would	   need	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   automobiles.	   This	   case	   originated	   from	   the	  National	   Prohibition	   Act,	   which	   was	   passed	   to	   enforce	   the	   Eighteenth	   Amendment	   that	  effectively	   prohibited	   the	   manufacture,	   sale,	   or	   transportation	   of	   alcohol.	   The	   National	  Prohibition	  Act	  not	  only	  enforced	  the	  Eighteenth	  Amendment,	  but	  also	  stated,	  “No	  search	  warrant	  shall	  issue	  to	  search	  any	  private	  dwelling	  occupied	  as	  such	  unless	  it	  is	  being	  used	  for	   the	  unlawful	   sale	  of	   intoxicating	   liquor,	  or	  unless	   it	   is	   in	  part	  used	   for	   some	  business	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purpose	   such	   as	   a	   store,	   shop,	   saloon,	   restaurant,	   hotel,	   or	   boarding	   house.”11	  The	   Act	  continued	  by	  stating	   “When	  the	  commissioner,	  his	  assistants,	  inspectors,	  or	  any	  officer	  of	  the	  law	  shall	   discover	   any	  person	   in	   the	   act	   of	   transporting	   in	   violation	  of	   the	   law,	  intoxicating	   liquors	   in	   any	  wagon,	   buggy,	   automobile,	  water	   or	   air	   craft,	   or	  other	   vehicle,	   it	   shall	   be	   his	   duty	   to	   seize	   any	   and	   all	   intoxicating	   liquors	  found	   therein	   being	   transported	   contrary	   to	   law.	   Whenever	   intoxicating	  liquors	   transported	   or	   possessed	   illegally	   shall	   be	   seized	   by	   an	   officer	   he	  shall	   take	   possession	   of	   the	   vehicle	   and	   team	   or	   automobile,	   boat,	   air	   or	  water	  craft,	  or	  any	  other	  conveyance,	  and	  shall	  arrest	  any	  person	   in	  charge	  thereof.”	  (ibid.)	   Additionally,	   the	   twenty-­‐fourth	  section	  of	   the	  Act	  of	  1789,	  which	  was	  created	   to	  regulate	  the	  collection	  of	  Duties,	  states: “That	   every	   collector,	   naval	   officer	   and	   surveyor,	   or	   other	   person	   specially	  appointed	   by	   either	   of	   them	   for	   that	   purpose,	   shall	   have	   full	   power	   and	  authority,	   to	   enter	   any	   ship	   or	   vessel,	   in	   which	   they	   shall	   have	   reason	   to	  suspect	  any	  goods,	  wares	  or	  merchandise	  subject	  to	  duty	  shall	  be	  concealed;	  and	   therein	   to	   search	   for,	   seize,	   and	   secure	   any	   such	   goods,	   wares	   or	  merchandise;	  and	  if	  they	  shall	  have	  cause	  to	  suspect	  a	  concealment	  thereof,	  in	  any	  particular	  dwelling	  house,	  store,	  building,	  or	  other	  place,	  they	  or	  either	  of	   them	   shall,	   upon	   application	  on	  oath	   or	   affirmation	   to	   any	   justice	   of	   the	  peace,	  be	  entitled	  to	  a	  warrant	  to	  enter	  such	  house,	  store,	  or	  other	  place	  (in	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the	   daytime	   only)	   and	   there	   to	   search	   for	   such	   goods,	   and	   if	   any	   shall	   be	  found,	   to	  seize	  and	  secure	  the	  same	  for	  trial;	  and	  all	  such	  goods,	  wares	  and	  merchandise,	  on	  which	  the	  duties	  shall	  not	  have	  been	  paid	  or	  secured,	  shall	  be	  forfeited.”12 Carroll	  v.	  United	  States	  brought	  forth	  a	  myriad	  of	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  many	  acts	  that	   were	   created	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   so	   that	   the	   Eighteenth	  Amendment	  could	  be	  better	  enforced.	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  goods	  being	   concealed	   in	   a	   dwelling	  house	   or	   similar	   place,	   versus	   goods	   concealed	   in	   a	  movable	  vessel	  where	  “they	  could	  readily	  be	  put	  out	  of	  reach	  of	  a	  search	  warrant.”	  (ibid.)	  The	  Court	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  would	  be	  unreasonable	  for	  the	  officer	  of	  law	  to	  be	  authorized	  to	   stop	   and	   check	   every	   single	   passing	   automobile	   on	   the	   chance	   that	   they	   might	   find	  prohibited	   alcohol,	   which	  would	   “subject	   all	   persons	   lawfully	   using	   the	   highways	   to	   the	  inconvenience	  and	   indignity	  of	   such	  a	   search.”	   (ibid.)	  The	  Court	   concluded	   that	   for	   those	  lawfully	  within	  the	  country	  who	  are	  also	  entitled	  to	  use	  public	  highways,	  have	  a	  “right	  to	  free	  passage	  without	  interruption	  or	  search	  unless	  there	  is	  known	  to	  a	  competent	  official,	  authorized	   to	   search,	   probable	   cause	   for	   believing	   that	   their	   vehicles	   are	   carrying	  contraband	  or	  illegal	  merchandise.”	  (ibid.)	  	   The	   conclusion	   of	   Carroll	   v.	   United	   States	   is	   important	   because	   it	   introduces	  automobiles	   into	   the	  world	   of	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment.	  Despite	   being	  movable,	   the	  Court	  clarified	   that	   probable	   cause	   is	   still	   necessary	   for	   a	   search	   to	   take	   place.	   This	   set	   the	  precedent	  that	  added	  to	  the	  furthering	  away	  of	  warrantless	  or	  unreasonable	  searches.	  This	  decision	  announced	  that	  the	  Court	  was	  not	  in	  favor	  or	  searches	  of	  any	  kind	  that	  happened	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Carroll	  v.	  United	  States	  
	   13	  
without	  probable	  cause.	  Incidentally,	  this	  decision	  strengthened	  the	  argument	  that	  privacy	  is	  also	  a	  fundamental	  right	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  protected.	  	  The	   case	   Katz	   v.	   United	   States	   was	   another	   monumental	   Fourth	   Amendment	  decision.	   Federal	   agents	   suspected	   Katz	   was	   transmitting	   gambling	   information	   to	   his	  clients	  in	  other	  states	  over	  the	  phone.	  The	  agents	  attached	  an	  eavesdropping	  device	  to	  the	  outside	   of	   a	   public	   telephone	   booth	   that	   was	   commonly	   used	   by	   Katz.	   Based	   on	   the	  recordings	   of	   his	   conversations,	   Katz	  was	   convicted	   under	   an	   eight-­‐count	   indictment	   for	  the	   illegal	   transmission	   of	  wagering	   information	   from	  Los	  Angeles	   to	  Boston	   and	  Miami.	  The	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  tasked	  with	  answering	  the	  following	  question:	  Does	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  protection	  against	  unreasonable	  searches	  and	  seizures	  require	  the	  police	  to	  obtain	  a	  search	  warrant	  in	  order	  to	  wiretap	  a	  public	  pay	  phone?	  In	  a	  7-­‐1	  decision,	  the	  court	  answered	  yes,	  a	  search	  warrant	  is	  required.	   Katz	  v.	  United	  States	  offers	  some	  unique	  new	  aspects	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.	  Key	  details	  of	  this	  case	  include	  the	  telephone	  that	  was	  used	  being	  available	  to	  and	  located	  in	  the	  public,	   and	   that	   individuals	   had	   to	   pay	   to	   use	   it.	   Additionally,	   the	   pay	   phone	   was	   in	   an	  enclosed	  space	  that	  offered	  the	  customer	  privacy	   from	  the	  outdoors.	  The	  Court	  set	  about	  answering	   two	  key	  questions:	  1)	   Is	  a	  public	   telephone	  booth	  a	   constitutionally	  protected	  area?	  2)	  Is	  the	  physical	  penetration	  of	  a	  constitutionally	  protected	  area	  necessary	  before	  a	  search	  and	  seizure	  can	  be	  said	  to	  violate	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment?	  Justice	  Stewart	  delivered	  the	  opinion	  of	   the	  Court,	   and	  pointed	  out	   that	   searching	   for	  a	   “constitutionally	  protected	  area”	  detracted	  from	  the	  key	  issue.	  Justice	  Stewart	  explained	  that	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  serves	  to	  protect	  people,	  not	  places.	  He	  further	  explained	  that,	  “What	  a	  person	  knowingly	  exposes	  to	  the	  public,	  even	  in	  his	  own	  home	  or	  office,	  is	  not	  a	  subject	  of	  Fourth	  Amendment	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protection.	   But	   what	   he	   seeks	   to	   preserve	   as	   private,	   even	   in	   an	   area	   accessible	   to	   the	  public,	  may	  be	  constitutionally	  protected.”13 The	  government	  attempted	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  phone	  booth	  was	  constructed	  of	  glass,	  which	   prevented	   any	   privacy.	   However	   Justice	   Stewart	   pointed	   out	   that	   Katz	   sought	   to	  exclude	   the	   uninvited	   ear,	   not	   the	   intruding	   eye.	   Justice	   Stewart	   stated	   that,	   “One	   who	  occupies	  it	  [the	  telephone	  booth],	  shuts	  the	  door	  behind	  him,	  and	  pays	  the	  toll	  that	  permits	  him	  to	  place	  a	  call	  is	  surely	  entitled	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  words	  he	  utters	  into	  the	  mouthpiece	  will	  not	  be	  broadcast	  to	  the	  world.	  To	  read	  the	  Constitution	  more	  narrowly	  is	  to	  ignore	  the	  vital	  role	  that	  the	  public	  telephone	  has	  come	  to	  play	  in	  private	  communication.”	  (ibid.)	  For	  the	   concurring	   opinion,	   Justice	   Harlan	   stated	   that,	   “The	   point	   is	   not	   that	   the	   booth	   is	  ‘accessible	   to	   the	  public’	  at	  other	   times…	  but	   that	   it	   is	  a	   temporarily	  private	  place	  whose	  momentary	   occupants'	   expectations	   of	   freedom	   from	   intrusion	   are	   recognized	   as	  reasonable.”(ibid.)	  	  Justice	  Black	  wrote	  the	  dissenting	  opinion	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  founding	  fathers	  would	  have	   taken	   the	   concept	   of	   eavesdropping	   into	   consideration	  when	  writing	  the	   Fourth	   Amendment.	   He	   concluded	   that	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   does	   not	   apply	   to	  eavesdropping.	   Given	  the	  changes	  in	  technology,	  the	  concept	  of	  eavesdropping	  has	  evolved	  greatly.	  What	  once	  required	  physical	  proximity	  now	  has	  infinite	  boundaries.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  founding	  fathers	  did	  not	  imagine	  a	  time	  in	  when	  communication	  is	  as	  instantaneous	  as	  it	  is	  today,	  and	  therefore	  could	  never	  have	  predicted	  the	  evolution	  of	  eavesdropping. Another	   important	   case	   to	   draw	   from	   is	   Kyllo	   v.	   United	   States.	   This	   is	   a	  groundbreaking	   case	   as	   it	   was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   times	   the	   United	   States	   Supreme	   Court	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touched	   on	   new	   technological	   advances	   and	   how	   they	   might	   alter	   the	   way	   in	   which	  searches	   and	   seizures	   are	   conducted.	   The	   case	   begins	  with	   a	  Department	   of	   the	   Interior	  agent	   suspecting	   Danny	   Kyllo	   of	   growing	   marijuana.	   The	   agent	   used	   a	   thermal-­‐imaging	  device	   to	   scan	   his	   residence,	   which	   allowed	   the	   agent	   to	   see	   if	   the	   amount	   of	   heat	  emanating	  from	  the	  home	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  high-­‐intensity	  lamps	  generally	  used	  for	  indoor	  marijuana	   growth.14	  The	   imaging	   revealed	   hot	   spots	   within	   the	   home,	   and	   along	  with	   informants,	   and	   utility	   bills,	   a	   federal	   magistrate	   judge	   issued	   a	   warrant	   to	   search	  Kyllo’s	  home.	  The	  search	  resulted	  in	  the	  finding	  of	  marijuana	  plants	  and	  Kyllo	  was	  arrested.	  Though	  Kyllo	   argued	   that	   the	   use	   of	   thermal	   imaging	   violated	   his	   right	   to	   privacy	   in	   his	  home,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  held	  that	  he	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  hide	  the	  heat	  escaping	  from	  his	  home,	   and	   the	   imager	   “did	   not	   expose	   any	   intimate	   details	   of	   Kyllo’s	   life”.	   (ibid.)	   The	  question	   that	   was	   brought	   forth	   to	   the	   United	   States	   Supreme	   Court	   was	   the	   following:	  Does	   the	   use	   of	   a	   thermal-­‐imaging	   device	   to	   detect	   relative	   amounts	   of	   heat	   emanating	  from	   a	   private	   home	   constitute	   an	   unconstitutional	   search	   in	   violation	   of	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment?	   In	   a	   5-­‐4	   decision,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   search	  was	   unconstitutional.	   The	   Court	  stated	  that	  at	  the	  very	  core	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  stands	  the	  right	  of	  a	  man	  to	  retreat	  into	   his	   own	   home	   and	   there	   be	   free	   from	   unreasonable	   governmental	   intrusion.15	  The	  thermal	  imaging	  device,	  called	  the	  Agema	  Thermovision	  210,	  detects	  infrared	  radiation	  and	  operates	  like	  a	  video	  camera	  showing	  heat	  images.	  However,	  a	  line	  must	  be	  drawn	  between	  what	  is	  reasonable	  and	  what	  exceeds	  entry	  into	  the	  house.	  The	  thermal	  imaging	  device	  is	  not	   something	   that	   is	   generally	   used	   by	   the	   public,	   and	   therefore	   it	   is	   not	   reasonable	   to	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assume	  that	  individuals	  can	  secede	  that	  right	  to	  that	  specific	  type	  of	  privacy.	  The	  Court	  held	  that,	   “where,	   as	   here,	   the	  Government	   uses	   a	   device	   that	   is	   not	   in	   general	   public	   use,	   to	  explore	  details	  of	  the	  home	  that	  would	  previously	  have	  been	  unknowable	  without	  physical	  intrusion,	   the	   surveillance	   is	   a	   ‘search’	   and	   is	   presumptively	   unreasonable	   without	   a	  warrant.”	   (ibid.)	   This	   conclusion	   is	   important	   because	   it	   highlights	   new	   technology	   as	  something	  that	  is	  not	  yet	  in	  general	  public	  use.	  However,	  technology	  such	  as	  this	  thermal	  imaging	  device	  may	  become	  more	  readily	  available	  to	  the	  public	  in	  the	  future.	  Homes	  are	  more	   strongly	   protected	   by	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   than	   anything	   else.	   Technology	   is	  advancing	  at	  an	  incredible	  rate,	  while	  also	  becoming	  more	  accessible.	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  courts	  should	  maintain	  that,	  regardless	  of	  the	  availability	  or	  accessibility	  of	  the	  technology	  in	   question,	   invasion	   of	   privacy	   beyond	   what	   can	   be	   perceived	   with	   human	   senses	   is	  unreasonable.	   For	   example,	   binoculars	   are	   enhancing	   human	   eyesight,	   whereas	   infrared	  cameras	  are	  going	  beyond	  what	  humans	  are	  capable	  of	  doing	  independently.	   The	   case	   of	   United	   States	   v.	   Comprehensive	   Drug	   Testing	   investigated	   whether	  broad	   blanket	   type	   searches	   and	   seizures	   were	   constitutional.	   This	   case	   involved	   many	  players	  and	   is	   incredibly	   intricate.	  The	  case	  began	   in	  2002	  when	   the	   federal	  government	  began	  investigating	  the	  Bay	  Area	  Lab	  Cooperative	  (BALCO),	  which	  it	  suspected	  of	  providing	  steroids	  to	  professional	  baseball	  players.	  It	  also	  happened	  that	  that	  year	  the	  Major	  League	  Baseball	   Players	   Association	   also	   entered	   into	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   Major	   League	  Baseball,	   “providing	   for	   suspicionless	   drug	   testing	   of	   all	   players”. 16 	  As	   part	   of	   the	  agreement,	   urine	   samples	  were	   to	   be	   collected	   during	   the	   first	   year,	   and	   they	  would	   be	  tested	   for	   banned	   substances	   including	   steroids.	   It’s	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   players	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  U.S.	  v.	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Testing	  
	   17	  
were	   assured	   that	   the	   results	   would	   remain	   anonymous	   and	   confidential.	   This	   program	  was	   administered	   by	   an	   independent	   business,	   called	   Comprehensive	   Drug	   Testing,	   Inc.,	  although	  the	  actual	   tests	  were	  performed	  by	  Quest	  Diagnostics,	   Inc.	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Testing	  did	  however	  maintain	  a	  list	  of	  the	  players	  and	  their	  respective	  test	  results.	   Now,	   back	   to	   the	   investigation	   the	   federal	   government	   was	   involved	   with:	   the	  BALCO	   investigation.	   During	   this	   investigation,	   the	   federal	   government	   learned	   of	   ten	  baseball	  players	  that	  had	  tested	  positive	  in	  the	  CDT	  program.	  The	  government	  then	  secured	  a	   grand	   jury	   subpoena	   in	   the	   Northern	   District	   of	   California	   seeking	   all	   “drug	   testing	  records	   and	   specimens”	   pertaining	   to	   Major	   League	   Baseball	   in	   CDT’s	   possession.	   CDT	  responded	  by	  attempting	  to	  file	  a	  motion	  to	  quash	  the	  subpoena.	  But	  the	  government	  had	  then	  obtained	  a	  warrant	  in	  the	  Central	  District	  of	  California	  authorizing	  the	  search	  of	  CDT’s	  facilities	  in	  Long	  Beach.	  The	  warrant	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  records	  of	  the	  ten	  players	  that	  the	  government	   had	   probable	   cause	   for,	   but	   when	   the	   warrant	   was	   being	   executed	   the	  government	  seized	  and	  reviewed	  the	  drug	  testing	  records	  for	  hundreds	  of	  players	  in	  Major	  League	  Baseball.17	  Now,	  CDT	  had	  the	  drug	  testing	  records,	  but	  the	  actual	  specimens	  were	  kept	   at	  Quest	  Diagnostics.	   Because	   of	   that,	   the	   government	   obtained	   a	  warrant	   from	   the	  District	   of	   Nevada	   for	   the	   urine	   samples.	   The	   government	   also	   obtained	   additional	  warrants	   for	   records	   at	  CDT’s	   facilities	   in	  Long	  Beach	  and	  Quest’s	   facilities	   in	  Las	  Vegas.	  And	   finally,	   the	   government	   served	   CDT	   and	   Quest	   with	   new	   subpoenas	   demanding	  production	  of	  the	  records	  it	  had	  just	  seized.	  (ibid.)	   The	  Central	  District	  of	  California	  found	  that	  the	  government	  acted	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  warrant	  and	  ordered	  that	  the	  property	  be	  returned.	  This	  order	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	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Cooper	  Order,	   named	   after	   the	  presiding	   judge,	   Judge	  Cooper.	  However,	   the	   government	  didn’t	   just	   stop	   there.	   The	   warrant	   the	   government	   received	   explicitly	   required	   that	  “computer	  personnel”	  conduct	  the	  initial	  review	  of	  the	  seized	  data,	  and	  be	  responsible	  for	  segregating	   materials	   that	   were	   not	   the	   object	   of	   the	   warrant	   so	   that	   they	   could	   be	  returned	  to	  their	  owner.	  Judge	  Cooper	  found	  that	  this	  had	  been	  entirely	  ignored	  and	  a	  case	  agent	  had	  sifted	  out	   information	  pertaining	   to	  all	  professional	  baseball	  players,	  and	  used	  that	   information	   as	   probable	   cause	   to	   then	   gain	   access	   to	   additional	   warrants	   and	  subpoenas.	  If	  this	  sounds	  illegal	  and	  unconstitutional	  to	  you,	  you’re	  not	  the	  only	  one	  who	  thinks	  so.	  Another	  judge,	  Judge	  Illston	  found,	  “no	  forensic	  lab	  analysis,	  no	  defusing	  of	  booby	  traps,	   no	   decryption,	   no	   cracking	   of	   passwords	   and	   certainly	   no	   effort	   by	   a	   dedicated	  computer	   specialist	   to	   separate	  data	   for	  which	   the	  government	  had	  probable	   cause	   from	  everything	   else	   in	   the	   Tracey	   Directory.”18	  Here,	   you	   have	   an	   instance	   of	   the	   federal	  government	  blatantly	  violating	  a	  warrant.	  The	  Court	  reflected	  this	  by	  stating,	  “it	  was	  wholly	  unnecessary	  for	  the	  case	  agent	  to	  view	  any	  data	  for	  which	  the	  government	  did	  not	  already	  have	  probable	  cause	  because	  there	  was	  an	  agent	  at	  the	  scene	  who	  was	  specially	  trained	  in	  computer	   forensics.”	   (ibid.)	   It	   was	   also	   noted	   that,	   “Judge	   Cooper	   found	   that	   the	  government	  utterly	  failed	  to	  follow	  the	  warrant’s	  protocol.	  Judge	  Illston	  also	  found	  that	  the	  government’s	  seizure,	  in	  callous	  disregard	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  reached	  information	  clearly	  not	  covered	  by	  a	  warrant.”	  (ibid.)	  So	  here,	  you	  have	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  federal	  government	   purposefully	   violated	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   in	   order	   to	   get	   its	   hands	   on	  information	  as	  to	  which	  it	  lacked	  probable	  cause.	  (ibid.)	  The	  government’s	  defense	  was	  that	  they	   happened	   upon	   the	   information	   accidentally,	   and	   that	   the	   discovery	   fell	   under	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  U.S.	  v.	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Testing	  	  
	   19	  
plain	  view	  exception.	  However,	  the	  plain	  view	  exception	  cannot	  be	  applied	  when	  the	  case	  agent	   looked	   through	   all	   of	   the	   data,	   and	   the	   information	   was	   not	   accidentally	   and	  unintentionally	  discovered.	   The	   case	   resulted	   in	   the	  Ninth	   Circuit	   deciding	   en	   banc	   that	   the	   government	   had,	  “violated	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   rights	   of	   the	   parties	   when	   it	   conducted	   an	   overbroad	  seizure	   of	   electronic	   drug	   testing	   records	   of	  Major	   League	   Baseball	   players.”	   (ibid.)	   This	  decision	   set	   an	   important	   precedent	   as	   it	   highlighted	   two	  main	   issues:	   the	   specificity	   of	  warrants	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  third	  party	  to	  handle	  the	  segregation	  of	  data	  as	  digital	  data	  can	  be	  immense.	   Another	   landmark	   Fourth	   Amendment	   case	   was	   United	   States	   v.	   Jones.	   In	   2004,	  Antoine	  Jones,	  owner	  and	  operator	  of	  a	  nightclub	  in	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia,	  came	  under	  suspicion	  of	  trafficking	  in	  narcotics	  and	  was	  made	  the	  target	  of	  an	  investigation	  by	  a	  joint	  FBI	   and	   Metropolitan	   Police	   Department	   task	   force.	   The	   police	   investigated	   Jones	   by	  surveying	   the	   nightclub,	   installing	   cameras	   focused	   on	   the	   club,	   and	   installing	   a	   pen	  register	  and	  a	  wiretap	  covering	  Jones’s	  cell	  phone.	  In	  2005,	  Antoine	  Jones	  was	  arrested	  for	  drug	   possession	   after	   police	   had	   attached	   a	   GPS	   tracker	   to	   his	   car.	   The	   police	   used	   the	  tracker	  to	  monitor	  his	  movements	  for	  a	  month	  without	  judicial	  approval.	  The	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  following	  question:	  did	  the	  warrantless	  use	  of	  a	  tracking	  device	  on	  Jones's	  vehicle	  to	  monitor	  its	  movements	  on	  public	  streets	  violate	  Jones’s	  Fourth	  Amendment	  rights?19	  In	  a	  unanimous	  decision,	  the	  Court	  ruled:	  yes-­‐-­‐this	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  the	   Fourth	  Amendment.	   Justice	   Scalia	   noted	   that	   the	   case	   resolved	   into	   a	   singular	   issue:	  whether	   the	   attachment	   of	   a	   Global-­‐Positioning-­‐System	   (GPS)	   tracking	   device	   to	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Oyez,	  United	  States	  v.	  Jones	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individual’s	  vehicle,	  and	  subsequent	  use	  of	  that	  device	  to	  monitor	  the	  vehicle’s	  movements	  on	   public	   streets,	   constitutes	   a	   search	   or	   seizure	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment.20	   
The	   Government	   applied	   to	   the	   United	   States	   District	   Court	   for	   the	   District	   of	  Columbia	   for	   a	   warrant	   authorizing	   the	   use	   of	   an	   electronic	   tracking	   device	   on	   a	   car	  registered	  to	  Jones’s	  wife.	  The	  warrant	  was	  issued,	  however	  it	  authorized	  installation	  of	  the	  device	  in	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  within	  ten	  days.	  Agents	  installed	  the	  GPS	  tracking	  device	  eleven	   days	   later	   and	   in	  Maryland,	   blatantly	   violating	   two	   terms	   of	   the	  warrant.	   Over	   a	  four-­‐week	  period,	  the	  device	  relayed	  over	  two	  thousand	  pages	  of	  data.	  (ibid.)	  In	  the	  Court’s	  opinion,	  Justice	  Scalia	  drew	  back	  to	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  founding	  fathers	  and	  stated,	  “It	  is	  important	   to	   be	   clear	   about	   what	   occurred	   in	   this	   case:	   The	   Government	   physically	  occupied	  private	  property	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  information.	  We	  have	  no	  doubt	  that	  such	  a	  physical	  intrusion	  would	  have	  been	  considered	  a	  ‘search’	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  when	  it	  was	  adopted.”	  (ibid.)	   In	   a	   concurring	   opinion,	   Justice	   Alito	   analyzed	   the	   case	   by	   asking	   whether	   the	  respondent's	   reasonable	   expectations	   of	   privacy	   were	   violated	   by	   the	   long-­‐term	  monitoring	   of	   the	  movements	   of	   the	   vehicle	   he	   drove.	   Justice	  Alito	   further	   discusses	   the	  role	   of	   technology	   in	   this	   case	   and	   states,	   “New	   technology	   may	   provide	   increased	  convenience	  or	  security	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  privacy,	  and	  many	  people	  may	  find	  the	  tradeoff	  worthwhile...On	   the	   other	   hand,	   concern	   about	   new	   intrusions	   on	   privacy	  may	   spur	   the	  enactment	   of	   legislation	   to	   protect	   against	   these	   intrusions.	   This	   is	   what	   ultimately	  happened	  with	  respect	  to	  wiretapping.”	  (ibid.)	  Justice	  Alito	  also	  explained	  how	  in	  the	  pre-­‐	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computer	   age,	   traditional	   surveillance	   was	   not	   discreet	   and	   was	   incredibly	   difficult	   and	  costly.	   Justice	   Alito	   pointed	   out	   that,	   “the	   surveillance	   at	   issue	   in	   this	   case—constant	  monitoring	  of	  the	  location	  of	  a	  vehicle	  for	  four	  weeks—would	  have	  required	  a	  large	  team	  of	  agents,	  multiple	   vehicles,	   and	  perhaps	   aerial	   assistance.	  Only	   an	   investigation	  of	   unusual	  importance	  could	  have	  justified	  such	  an	  expenditure	  of	  law	  enforcement	  resources.”	  (ibid.)	  When	   considering	   it	   from	   that	   angle,	   a	   simple	   drug	   possession	   charge	   is	   not	   enough	   to	  merit	  such	  a	  search.	  Again,	  this	  case	  came	  down	  to	  whether	  the	  monitoring	  of	  an	  individual	  accords	  with	  expectations	  of	  privacy	  that	  our	  society	  has	  recognized	  as	  reasonable.	  Despite	  our	   technological	   advances	  with	   GPS	   tracking	   and	   location	   services,	   society	   has	   still	   not	  willingly	  given	  up	  on	  the	  right	  to	  and	  expectation	  of	  privacy.	   
 	   These	  six	  cases	  together	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  what	  little	  privacy	  we	  have,	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  must	  be	  reevaluated	  when	  dealing	  with	  computer	  searches,	  as	  the	  protection	  offered	  should	  not	  only	  apply	  to	  tangible	  objects	  but	  should	  also	  extend	  to	  information	  that	  can	  be	  stored.	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IV. Search	  Warrants	  
 Search	  warrants	  inevitably	  bring	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  legal	  process,	  which	  I	  will	  not	  be	  addressing	  in	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  what	  the	  outcome	  should	  be,	  and	  not	  how	  it	  should	  reach	  there.	  That,	  I’ll	  leave	  to	  the	  lawyers.	  In	  terms	  of	  search	  warrants,	  I	  will	  be	  addressing	  the	  specifications	  and	  details	  through	  the	  following	  sections:	  explicitness,	  scope,	  time,	  and	  third	  party	  searches	  and	  analyses.	   
 Explicitness 
 According	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  issued	  warrants	  must	  describe	  the	  place	  to	  be	  searched	   and	   the	   persons	   or	   things	   to	   be	   seized.	   Computers	   are	   a	   bit	  more	   complicated	  since	  information	  is	  located	  within	  the	  hardware.	  When	  dealing	  with	  searching	  computers,	  search	  warrants	  must	  be	  explicit	   in	  exactly	  what	  they	  are	  searching	  for	  with	  reference	  to	  content	  and	  file/data	  types.	  Anything	  beyond	  that	  scope	  would	  constitute	  an	  illegal	  search.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  computers	  can	  store	  a	  lot	  of	  data.	  Because	  of	  this,	  when	  searching	  for	  something	  in	  particular,	  say	  a	  certain	  picture,	  you	  need	  to	  know	  what	  to	  search	  for.	  If	  you’re	  searching	  for	  a	  photo	  of	  a	  dog,	  you	  should	  search	  for	  the	  name	  at	  the	  very	  least.	   If	  you	   go	   in	   blindly	   with	   only	   an	   idea	   of	   what	   you’re	   looking	   for,	   you	   will	   essentially	   be	  searching	  for	  a	  needle	  in	  a	  haystack.	  However,	  in	  this	  scenario,	  the	  haystack	  would	  be	  your	  computer,	  and	  the	  government	  would	  be	  examining	  every	  piece	  of	  straw	  to	  see	  if	  it	  matches	  what	  it	  might	  be	  looking	  for.	  And	  if	  they	  happen	  to	  find	  something	  that	  isn’t	  legal,	  then	  they	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must	  act	  on	  it	  as	  well.	  It	  is	  unfair	  and	  unreasonable	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  blanket	  warrant	  be	  issued	  for	  a	  computer	  given	  the	  massive	  amount	  of	  data	  a	  computer	  can	  store.	   Instead,	   the	  warrant	  needs	   to	   specify	  what	   it	   is	   looking	   for	   before	   the	   search	   and	  seizure	   takes	   place.	   Orin	   Kerr,	   a	   professor	   of	   law	   at	   the	   George	   Washington	   University	  School	  of	  Law	  argues	  heavily	  that	   limitations	  and	  authorizations	  need	  to	  occur	   in	  ex	  post	  review	  in	  order	  to	  set	  the	  results	  in	  the	  proper	  manner.	  He	  states,	  “Ex	  post	  review	  provides	  the	   standard	   method	   for	   developing	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   reasonableness	   of	   searches	  executed	   pursuant	   to	  warrants.	   The	   government	   executes	   the	  warrant	   first.	   Then,	  when	  charges	  are	  filed,	  a	  defendant	  will	  move	  to	  suppress	  the	  evidence	  discovered.	  The	  court	  will	  hold	   a	   hearing	   about	   precisely	   how	   the	   warrant	   was	   executed,	   and	   will	   then	   issue	   an	  opinion	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  method	  of	  execution	  was	  reasonable.”21	  However,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	   this	   sets	   a	   dangerous	   precedent	   given	   the	   sheer	   amount	   of	   data	   that	   can	   be	   readily	  available	   in	   a	   computer.	   Allowing	   too	   many	   cases	   where	   they	   realize	   the	   error	   “in	  retrospect”	   is	  dangerous	  and	  undermines	   the	  right	   to	  privacy	  and	  unreasonable	  searches	  that	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  guarantees.	   In	  addition	  to	  placing	  restrictions	  before	  the	  warrant	   is	  executed,	   I	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  warrant	  must	  be	  explicit	  in	  categories	  of	  content.	  In	  terms	  of	  particularity,	  the	  warrant	  needs	   to	   specify	  whether	   the	   search	   is	  being	   conducted	  on	   the	  physical	   computer	  or	   the	  information	  that	  is	  stored	  within	  the	  computer.	  In	  Riley	  v.	  California,	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  alludes	  to	  a	  phone’s	  data	  being	  safe,	  though	  a	  razor	  blade	  hidden	  in	  the	  phone	  case	  could	  pose	  a	  threat.	  Under	  that	   line	  of	  thought,	  contraband	  could	  be	  hidden	  within	  the	  physical	  components	  of	  a	  computer.	  It	  is	  unreasonable	  to	  not	  distinguish	  between	  the	  physical	  data	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and	  physical	  computer.	  If	  a	  warrant	  were	  for	  the	  search	  of	  the	  physical	  computer,	  it	  would	  go	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   said	   warrant	   to	   search	   the	   digital	   data	   within	   the	   computer.	  Therefore,	  when	  issuing	  a	  warrant	  for	  the	  search	  of	  a	  computer,	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  physical	  computer	  and	  the	  digital	  data	  needs	  to	  be	  apparent. If	  the	  warrant	  is	  for	  the	  search	  of	  the	  digital	  information	  stored	  within	  a	  computer,	  the	  warrant	  must	   specify	   exactly	  what	   it	   is	   looking	   for	   in	   terms	  of	   files	   and	   content.	   For	  example,	   “illegally	   downloaded	   music”	   is	   not	   sufficient.	   The	   warrant	   needs	   to	   explicitly	  state	  what	   file	   types	   it	   is	   looking	   for.	  Computers	  are	  clever,	   and	  often	   times,	   file	   types	   in	  terms	  of	  extensions	  are	  not	  what	  they	  appear.	  A	  photo	  that	  is	  of	  PNG	  file	  type	  can	  simply	  change	  its	  extension	  so	  that	  it	  appears	  as	  an	  XLS,	  or	  Excel	  spreadsheet	  file	  type.	  If	  a	  warrant	  were	  to	  search	  for	  child	  pornography,	  it	  would	  not	  search	  through	  spreadsheets,	  and	  would	  then	  miss	   this	   file.	   In	   order	   to	   combat	   this,	   the	   actual	   file	   type	   needs	   to	   be	   determined	  through	   the	   file	   command,	   or	   equivalent,	   for	   pattern	   matches.	   The	   file	   command	   is	   a	  standard	  Unix	  program	  that	  recognizes	  the	  type	  of	  data	  contained	  in	  a	  computer	  file.	  This	  is	  a	  beneficial	  check	  because	  it	  can	  comb	  through	  the	  data	  and	  not	  expose	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  data	  to	  anyone.	  The	  file	  command	  can	  only	  tell	  you	  what	  the	  file	  looks	  like	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  data	   it	   contains	   (photos,	  PDFs),	   but	   it	   does	  not	   tell	   you	  what	   the	   content	   is.	  This	  ensures	   that	   a	   reasonable	   search	   occurs,	   and	   the	   owner’s	   privacy	   (in	   terms	   of	   data	   that	  doesn’t	  pertain	  to	  the	  case)	  is	  not	  violated.	   
 Scope The	   scope	   of	   the	   search	   warrant	   needs	   to	   be	   specified	   before	   the	   warrant	   is	  executed.	   The	   restrictions	   and	   scope	  must	   be	   identified	   and	   stated	   before	   any	   searching	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takes	   place.	   I	   argue	   that	   ex-­‐ante	   restrictions	   are	   necessary	   to	   maintain	   the	   integrity,	  intentions,	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.	   In	   order	   to	   limit	   the	   amount	   of	  information	   outside	   the	  warrant	   comes	   into	   plain	   view,	   unlike	  what	   happened	   in	  United	  States	  v.	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Testing,	  it	   is	  important	  to	  impose	  limits	  on	  how	  computers	  are	  searched.	  This	  is	  a	  practice	  that	  has	  been	  done	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  must	  become	  a	  necessity	  for	   search	  warrants	   pertaining	   to	   digital	   data.	   Orin	   Kerr	   discusses	   this,	   and	   provides	   an	  example	  of	  when	  ex-­‐ante	  restrictions	  were	  used.	  He	  states,	   “In	  In	  the	  Matter	  of	  the	  Search	  of:	  3817	  W.	  West	  End,	  the	  government	  applied	  for	  a	  warrant	  to	  search	  a	  suspect’s	  home	  and	  seize	  her	  computers	  to	  search	  them	  for	  evidence	  of	  tax	  fraud.	  The	  magistrate	  judge	  signed	  the	  warrant,	  but	  placed	  a	  condition	  on	  the	  warrant	  forbidding	  the	  government	  to	  search	  any	  seized	  computers	  until	  the	  government	  had	  proposed	  and	  the	  magistrate	  had	  accepted	   a	   search	   protocol.	   The	   government	   seized	   a	   Hewlett-­‐Packard	  computer	  and	  a	  number	  of	  computer	  disks,	  and	  then	  met	  with	  the	  magistrate	  judge	   to	  discuss	   the	  search	  protocol.	  The	  government	  argued	   that	   the	   judge	  lacked	   any	   authority	   to	   restrict	   the	   government’s	   search	   of	   the	   seized	  computer,	  but	  the	  magistrate	  concluded	  that	  such	  a	  protocol	  was	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  warrant	  was	  executed	  in	  a	  reasonable	  way.	  The	  judge	  then	  gave	  the	  government	  twenty-­‐one	  days	  to	  submit	  a	  search	  protocol,	  with	  the	  warning	   that	   if	   the	   government	   did	   not	   do	   so	   it	   would	   have	   to	   return	   the	  computer	  unsearched.”22 
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This	   is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	   the	   types	  of	   reasonable	   restrictions	   that	   should	  be	  put	   in	  place.	  When	  reviewing	  the	  case	  of	  United	  States	  v.	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Testing,	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  the	  warrant	  was	  executed	  in	  an	  unreasonable	  manner.	  The	  government	  went	  beyond	   the	   scope	   that	   was	   originally	   stated	   and	   intended.	   The	   case	   of	   United	   States	   v.	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Testing	  set	  a	  precedent	  that	  broad	  blanket	  type	  searches	  and	  seizures	  were	   not	   constitutional.	   The	   Cooper	   Order	   specifically	   ordered	   that	   the	   property	   and	  records	   containing	   the	   drug	   testing	   records	   be	   returned	   to	   the	   rightful	   owners.	  Additionally,	  reasonable	  restrictions	  are	  necessary	   in	  order	   to	  uphold	  the	  probable	  cause	  necessity.	   In	   the	  United	   States	   v.	   Comprehensive	  Drug	  Testing	   case,	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   the	  government	   disregarded	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment	   and	   accede	   information	  not	   covered	  by	  the	  warrant,	   in	  order	   to	  bypass	   the	   lack	  of	  probable	  cause.	  Without	   these	  restrictions,	  an	  individual	  is	  completely	  vulnerable,	  as	  it’s	  been	  stated	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  that	  our	  computers	  today	  hold	  massive	  amounts	  of	  personal	  data. 	   In	   the	   case	   of	   United	   States	   v.	   Comprehensive	  Drug	   Testing,	   Orin	   Kerr	   points	   out	  that,	   “according	   to	   the	   en	   banc	   court,	   magistrate	   judges	   should	   impose	   a	   series	   of	  conditions	  on	  computer	  search	  warrants	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  government	  does	  not	  overreach	  and	   find	   evidence	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  warrant.”	   (ibid.)	   Orin	   Kerr	   argues	   that	   these	  restrictions	  need	   to	  be	  discovered	  upon	   review	  of	   a	   case,	   however	   the	   reason	   that	   these	  restrictions	   be	   put	   into	   place	   ex-­‐ante	   is	   computers	   are	   a	   form	   of	   technology	   that	   is	  completely	  new	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  era.	  A	  single	  computer	  can	  hold	  the	  information	  found	   in	   a	   thousand	   houses	   and	   thousands	   of	   more	   file	   cabinets.	   Because	   of	   this,	   the	  warrant	  must	  provide	  some	  framework	  or	  else	  the	  search	  becomes	  unreasonable. 
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Additionally,	  the	  Vermont	  Supreme	  Court	  recently	  issued	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  magistrate	  judges	  have	  the	  discretion	  to	  attach	  ex	  ante	  or	  prospective	  conditions	  to	  a	  search	  warrant.	  The	  court	  concluded	  that	  ex	  ante	  search	  restrictions	  are	  “sometimes	  acceptable”.	  In	  a	  2012	  blog	  post,	  Orin	  Kerr	  writes,	  “in	  the	  court’s	  view,	  the	  warrant	  clause	  of	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment	   is	  not	   just	  about	  establishing	  probable	  cause	  and	  particularity.	  Rather,	   warrants	   are	   designed	   to	   minimize	   privacy	   invasions	   by	   making	   sure	   that	  “investigatory	   promise”	   of	   a	   search	   justifies	   the	   resulting	   “collateral	   exposure”	   in	   that	  particular	   case.”23	  Kerr	   continued	   to	   state	   that	   the	  Vermont	   court	  allowed	   the	  Magistrate	  judge	  to	  decide	  the	  level	  of	  restrictions	  based	  on	  how	  invasive	  the	  warrant	  is.	  Kerr	  phrased	  it	  well	  when	  he	  summarized	  that	  “ex	  ante	  restrictions	  are	  ‘sometimes’	  permitted	  as	  ways	  of	  regulating	  the	  process	  to	  try	  to	  protect	  privacy	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ‘interplay’	  between	  probable	  cause,	  particularity,	   and	   reasonableness.”	   (ibid.)	  Though	   this	   is	   an	  appellate	  decision,	   the	  use	  of	  ex	  ante	  restrictions	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  search	  warrants	  pertaining	  to	  computers	  and	  digital	  data.	   
 Time 
 The	  search	  warrant	  should	  specify	  a	  time	  limit	  for	  how	  long	  a	  computer	  can	  remain	  in	  the	  court’s	  possession.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  repealed	  or	  retroactively	  altered.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  court	  has	  a	  set	  amount	  of	  time	  to	  search	  through	  the	  computer	  to	  find	  what	  they	   are	   searching	   for.	   If	   anything	   is	   unable	   to	   be	   produced	  within	   that	   time	   frame,	   the	  computer	   is	   to	  be	  returned	  to	  the	  owner.	  Absent	  explicit	  permission	  from	  court,	  a	  search	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that	  goes	  beyond	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  time	  is	  unreasonable.	  Orin	  Kerr	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  this	   requirement	   in	   action	   with	   the	   case	   of	   United	   States	   v.	   Brunette.	   In	   this	   case,	   a	  magistrate	   judge	   issued	   a	   warrant	   to	   search	   computers	   with	   the	   stipulation	   that	   the	  forensic	  analysis	  of	   the	  computers	  had	  to	  be	  conducted	  within	  thirty	  days	  of	   the	  physical	  search.	   This	   established	   a	   two-­‐step	   process:	   physical	   search,	   then	   forensic	   analysis.	   The	  physical	  search	  was	  completed	  within	  five	  days,	  and	  the	  agents	  applied	  for	  and	  received	  an	  extension	   from	   the	  magistrate	   judge	   giving	   them	   an	   additional	   thirty	   days	   to	   search	   the	  computers.	   One	   of	   the	   computers	   was	   searched	   within	   the	   new	   extended	   period	   and	  revealed	   images	  of	  child	  pornography.	  The	  second	  computer	  was	  searched	  outside	  of	   the	  extended	   period	   and	   also	   revealed	   images	   of	   child	   pornography.	   The	   court	   ruled,	   “the	  images	  discovered	  in	  the	  renewed	  thirty-­‐day	  window	  were	  admissible,	  but	  that	  the	  images	  discovered	   on	   the	   second	   computer	   searched	   after	   the	   time	   had	   expired	   had	   to	   be	  suppressed	  based	  on	  the	  government’s	  failure	  “to	  adhere	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  search	  warrant	  and	  subsequent	  order.”24	   Establishing	   a	   reasonable	   time	   frame	   is	   something	   that	   can	   be	   assessed	   by	   the	  respective	  judge	  given	  the	  situation.	  If	  the	  warrant	  is	  for	  a	   large	  amount	  of	  data,	  then	  the	  time	   can	   be	   extended.	   However,	   it	   is	   unreasonable	   to	   have	   an	   unlimited	   time	   to	   search	  through	  data.	  This	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  Sixth	  Amendment,	  which	  guarantees	  the	  right	  to	  a	  speedy	  and	  public	  trial.	  Imagine	  if	  the	  government	  had	  a	  warrant	  to	  search	  a	  home	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  illegal	  firearms.	  It	  wouldn’t	  make	  sense	  for	  them	  to	  search	  through	  computers	  or	   hard	   drives	   because	   it	   would	   be	   impossible	   to	   find	   physical	   firearms	   in	   digital	   data.	  Additionally,	  it	  wouldn’t	  make	  sense	  for	  the	  government	  to	  be	  allowed	  an	  unlimited	  time	  to	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search	   through	   the	   entire	   house.	   Time	   restrictions	   are	   necessary	   because	   the	   search	  warrants	  aren’t	  being	  executed	  on	  someone	  that	  has	  already	  been	   found	  guilty.	  Since	   the	  individual	  has	  not	  been	  tried	  yet,	  and	  only	  evidence	  is	  being	  collected,	  it	  is	  inherently	  unfair	  and	   unreasonable	   to	   allow	   their	   personal	   and	   private	   property	   to	   be	   searched	   for	   an	  unlimited	   or	   unreasonable	   long	   period	   of	   time.	   The	   trial	  must	   commence	   at	   some	  point.	  Additionally,	  reasonable	  time	  restrictions	  will	  also	  ensure	  efficiency	  during	  searches.	  	  In	  United	  States	  v.	  Mutschelknaus,	  the	  magistrate	  judge	  imposed	  a	  requirement	  that	  the	   search	   of	   seized	   computers	   must	   occur	   within	   sixty	   days	   of	   the	   initial	   seizure.	   The	  defendant	  moved	  to	  suppress	  the	  evidence	  found	  on	  the	  computers,	  claiming	  the	  sixty	  days	  was	   unreasonable	   and	   that	   it	   violated	   Rule	   41e2A	   of	   the	   Federal	   Rules	   of	   Criminal	  Procedure,	  which	  requires	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  warrant	  within	  ten	  days.	  However,	  the	  Eighth	  Circuit	  disagreed,	  and	  noted	  that	  the	  agents	  had	  been	  able	  to	  search	  the	  computer	  within	  the	  stipulated	  sixty-­‐day	  period.	  Additionally,	  the	  Government	  contended	  that	  Rule	  41e2A	  of	  the	  Federal	  Rules	  of	  Criminal	  Procedure	  only	  requires	  that	  the	  search	  warrant	  be	  executed	  within	   ten	  days	   and	  does	  not	   require	   the	   subsequent	   examination	  of	   the	   items	   seized	   to	  take	  place	  within	  ten	  days.25	  In	  this	  case,	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  ruling	  from	  the	  magistrate	  judge,	  as	   the	   judge	   had	   set	   the	   time	   period	   based	   on	   the	   warrant	   that	   was	   brought	   forth.	  Additionally,	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  seize	  items	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  the	  time	  it	  would	  take	  to	  examine	  the	  seized	  items.	  Because	  of	  this,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  set	  separate	  reasonable	  time	   limits	   for	   executing	   the	   search	   and	   then	   for	   examining	   the	   seized	  materials.	  And	  as	  more	   cases	   come	   forth,	   the	   courts	   will	   be	   able	   to	   obtain	   a	   better	   idea	   of	   standard	   time	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duration	  for	  the	  search	  warrant.	  Thus	  they	  can	  work	  to	  make	  the	  time	  limit	  as	  reasonable	  as	  possible	  without	  ignoring	  people’s	  rights	  or	  obstructing	  justice.	   	   Third	  Party	  Searches	  and	  Analysis 
 The	   purpose	   of	   a	   search	   is	   to	   discover	   something	   that	   already	   exists.	   In	   order	   to	  create	   a	   fair	   trial,	   there	   cannot	   be	   a	   bias	   within	   the	   search	   procedure.	   All	   searches	   of	  computers	   and	   the	   analysis	   on	   the	   data	  must	   be	   conducted	   by	   a	   third-­‐party	   in	   order	   to	  avoid	   bias.	   This	   must	   be	   a	   requirement	   in	   all	   warrants	   involving	   computers.	   In	   United	  States	   v.	   Comprehensive	   Drug	   Testing,	   one	   of	   the	   stipulations	   of	   the	   warrant	   was	   that	  “computer	   personnel”	   conduct	   the	   initial	   review	   of	   the	   seized	   data	   and	   were	   to	   be	  responsible	  for	  segregating	  the	  materials	  not	  the	  object	  of	  the	  warrant	  for	  return	  to	  their	  owner.	  Without	  this	  stipulation,	  all	  of	  the	  contents	  would	  fall	  under	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine	  if	   the	   case	  agent	  was	   the	  one	   to	   sift	   through	  all	  of	   the	  data.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  government	  argued	   that	   it	   didn’t	   violate	   protocol	   because,	   “the	   warrant	   didn’t	   specify	   that	   only	  computer	   personnel	   could	   examine	   the	   seized	   files,	   and	   the	   case	   agent	   was	   therefore	  entitled	  to	  view	  them	  alongside	  the	  computer	  specialist.”26	  	  This	  argument	  is	  weak	  at	  best.	  However,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   this	   type	   of	   obtuse	   argument,	   I	   argue	   that	   search	   warrants	  pertaining	  to	  computers	  explicitly	  specify	  that	  only	  computer	  personnel	  or	  the	  third	  party	  be	  allowed	  to	  examine	  the	  seized	  data.	   Orin	   Kerr	   also	   discusses	   the	   idea	   of	   third	   party	   searches	   in	   his	   paper	   Ex	   Ante	  
Regulation	  of	  Computer	  Search	  and	  Seizure.	  He	  states,	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“Magistrate	   judges	   must	   require	   that	   case	   agents	   cannot	   conduct	   the	  electronic	   search	   themselves	   and	   must	   never	   learn	   of	   any	   evidence	  discovered	  outside	  the	  warrant	  during	  the	  electronic	  search.82	  The	  computer	  forensic	  analysis	  must	  be	  performed	  either	  by	  computer	  specialists	  who	  are	  not	   on	   the	   case	   or	   a	   non-­‐government	   third	   party	   hired	   to	   conduct	   the	  analysis.83	   In	   either	   event,	   the	   case	   agents	   with	   primary	   responsibility	   for	  bringing	  criminal	  charges	  must	  be	  walled	  off	  from	  any	  evidence	  outside	  the	  warrant’s	  scope.”27 I	   agree	   with	   the	   stipulation	   noted	   above-­‐-­‐it	   is	   imperative	   that	   the	   seized	   data	   not	   be	  exposed	   to	   any	   bias,	   and	   that	   the	   evidence	   and	   the	  warrant	   function	   dependently	   in	   the	  justice	   system.	   If	   the	   entirety	   of	   the	   seized	   data	   were	   exposed	   to	   individuals	   who	  were	  biased	   and	  were	   searching	   for	   illegal	   activity,	   then	   they	  would	  have	   an	   incentive	   to	   look	  through	  all	  of	  the	  data,	  thus	  rendering	  the	  by	  chance	  nature	  of	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine	  null.	  Additionally,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   computer	   is	   searched	   is	   important.	   Software	   that	  searches	   for	   specific	   triggers	   (i.e.	  what	   is	   explicitly	  mentioned	   in	   the	  warrant)	   should	  be	  used,	   rather	   than	   software	   that	   uses	   blanket	   searches	   that	   searches	   for	   anything	   that	   is	  illegal.	   	   Search	  warrants	   are	   complicated	   tools	   that	   have	   immense	  power.	   In	   order	   to	   use	  this	   tool	   appropriately	   when	   dealing	   with	   computers	   to	   avoid	   violating	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment,	  ex	  ante	  restrictions	  must	  be	  applied,	  the	  scope	  must	  be	  outlined,	  reasonable	  time	  limits	  for	  the	  search	  and	  analysis	  must	  be	  placed,	  copies	  of	  the	  data	  must	  be	  made,	  and	  it	  must	  be	  mandated	  that	  the	  searches	  and	  analysis	  be	  conducted	  by	  third	  party	  personnel.	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V. Search	  Incident	  to	  Arrest	  
 Riley	  brought	   forward	  the	  realization	   that	   today	  our	  phones	  are	  almost	  always	  on	  us.	   In	   the	  opinion	   for	   the	  unanimous	   court,	   Chief	   Justice	  Roberts	  wrote	   that	  modern	   cell	  phones	  are,	  “now	  such	  a	  pervasive	  and	  insistent	  part	  of	  daily	  life	  that	  the	  proverbial	  visitor	  from	   Mars	   might	   conclude	   they	   were	   an	   important	   feature	   of	   human	   anatomy.” 28	  Additionally,	  according	  to	  one	  poll,	  nearly	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  smartphone	  users	  report	  being	  within	   five	   feet	  of	   their	  phones	  most	  of	   the	   time,	  with	  12%	  admitting	   that	   they	  even	  use	  their	  phones	  in	  the	  shower.	  (ibid.)	  So	  on	  the	  off	  chance	  we	  are	  arrested,	  our	  phone	  is	  most	  likely	  going	   to	  be	   taken	  as	  well.	  So	  why	  do	   the	  police	  have	   the	  right	   to	   take	  our	  phone	   if	  we’ve	   been	   arrested?	   The	   case,	   Chimel	   v.	   California	   (1969)	   lays	   some	   of	   the	   current	  groundwork	   for	   the	   search	   incident	   to	   arrest	   principle.	   Chimel	   was	   arrested	   within	   his	  home,	   and	   the	   police	   officers	   proceeded	   to	   search	   his	   entire	   three-­‐bedroom	   house,	   and	  even	  went	   so	   far	   as	   searching	   through	   the	   contents	  of	  drawers.	  Due	   to	   the	  broad	   search	  that	   resulted	   from	   a	   mere	   arrest,	   the	   Court	   created	   the	   following	   stipulation	   and	  clarification	  for	  assessing	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  a	  search	  incident	  to	  arrest:	   “When	  an	  arrest	   is	  made,	   it	   is	  reasonable	   for	   the	  arresting	  officer	   to	  search	  the	   person	   arrested	   in	   order	   to	   remove	   any	  weapons	   that	   the	   latter	  might	  seek	   to	   use	   in	   order	   to	   resist	   arrest	   or	   effect	   his	   escape.	   Otherwise,	   the	  officer’s	  safety	  might	  well	  be	  endangered,	  and	  the	  arrest	  itself	  frustrated.	  In	  addition,	   it	   is	   entirely	   reasonable	   for	   the	  arresting	  officer	   to	   search	   for	  and	  seize	   any	   evidence	   on	   the	   arrestee’s	   person	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   its	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concealment	  or	  destruction.	   .	   .	   .	  There	   is	  ample	   justification,	   therefore,	   for	  a	  search	  of	  the	  arrestee’s	  person	  and	  the	  area	  ‘within	  his	  immediate	  control’—construing	   that	   phrase	   to	  mean	   the	   area	   from	  within	  which	   he	  might	   gain	  possession	  of	  a	  weapon	  or	  destructible	  evidence.”29 This	   provides	   a	   very	   reasonable	   explanation	   to	   the	   search	   incident	   to	   arrest	   principle.	   If	  someone	  was	   arrested	   and	   had	   a	  weapon	   on	   him	   or	   herself,	   they	   could	   harm	   someone.	  Additionally,	  having	  contraband	  on	  oneself	  is	  probable	  cause.	   	   Chimel	   v.	   California	   set	   the	   framework	   for	   the	   search	   incident	   to	   arrest	   principle;	  several	   other	   cases	   added	   the	   additional	   structure.	   In	   1973,	   United	   States	   v.	   Robinson	  applied	  the	  “Chimel	  analysis”	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  search	  of	  the	  arrestee’s	  person.	  Robinson	  was	  arrested	   for	  driving	  with	  a	  revoked	   license,	  and	  during	  the	  routine	  pat	  down	  search,	  the	  police	  officer	  felt,	  “an	  object	  that	  he	  could	  not	  identify	  in	  Robinson’s	  coat	  pocket”.30	  The	  object	  was	  a	  crumpled	  cigarette	  package.	  The	  office	  opened	  the	  package	  and	  found	  fourteen	  capsules	  of	  heroin.	  Based	  on	  Chimel	  v.	  California,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  concluded	  that	  this	  search	  was	  unreasonable	  because	  they	  felt	  that	  opening	  a	  cigarette	  package	  “could	  not	  be	  justified	   as	   part	   of	   a	   protective	   search	   for	   weapons”.	   (ibid.)	   However,	   the	   United	   States	  Supreme	   Court	   reversed	   this	   decision	   and	   deemed	   the	   search	   reasonable.	   It	  was	   argued	  that	  “[t]he	  authority	  to	  search	  the	  person	  incident	  to	  a	  lawful	  custodial	  arrest,	  while	  based	  upon	  the	  need	  to	  disarm	  and	  to	  discover	  evidence,	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  what	  a	  court	  may	  later	  decide	  was	  the	  probability	   in	  a	  particular	  arrest	  situation	  that	  weapons	  or	  evidence	  would	   in	   fact	  be	   found	  upon	   the	  person	  of	   the	   suspect.”	   (ibid.)	   Instead,	   the	  Court	   argued	  that	   a	   “custodial	   arrest	   of	   a	   suspect	   based	   on	   probable	   cause	   is	   a	   reasonable	   intrusion	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under	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment;	   that	   intrusion	  being	   lawful,	  a	  search	   incident	  to	  the	  arrest	  requires	   no	   additional	   justification.”	   (ibid.)	   In	   this	   decision,	   the	   Court	   chose	   not	   to	  differentiate	   the	   search	   of	   Robinson’s	   person	   and	   the	   examining	   of	   the	   cigarette	   packet	  found.	  This	   is	  an	   important	  piece	  as	   it	  set	   the	  precedent	   to	  allow	  officers	   to	  search	   items	  found	   during	   the	   standard	   search	   incident	   to	   arrest,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   there	   is	   a	  concern	  for	  loss	  of	  evidence	  or	  the	  concern	  for	  the	  arrestee	  being	  armed.	   	   Now	   that	   we’ve	   established	   the	   framework	   for	   the	   rationale	   behind	   the	   search	  incident	  to	  arrest	  principle,	   it	  must	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Riley	  and	  his	  cell	  phone.	   It’s	  clear	   that	   the	   cell	   phone	   is	   not	   a	   weapon.	   However	   due	   to	   its	   storage	   capacities,	   it	   can	  contain	   evidence.	   Yet,	   a	   cell	   phone	   cannot	   be	   compared	   to	   a	   crumpled	   package	   of	  cigarettes-­‐-­‐its	   contents	   are	   not	   as	   easily	   found	   and	   identifiable	   as	   fourteen	   capsules	   of	  heroin.	   Chief	   Justice	   Roberts	   noted,	   “Cellphones...place	   vast	   quantities	   of	   personal	  information	  literally	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  individuals.	  A	  search	  of	  the	  information	  on	  a	  cell	  phone	  bears	   little	   resemblance	   to	   the	   type	   of	   brief	   physical	   search	   considered	   in	   Robinson.”31	  	  Additionally,	   digital	   data	   simply	   is	   not	   as	   harmful	   as	   weapons,	   drugs,	   or	   other	   physical	  evidence:	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  search	  incident	  to	  arrest	  principle	  was	  established	  upon.	  Chief	   Justice	   Roberts	   even	   stated,	   “there	   are	   no	   comparable	   risks	  when	   the	   search	   is	   of	  digital	  data.”	  (ibid.)	  However,	  Chief	   Justice	  Roberts	  went	  on	  to	  note	  that	   law	  enforcement	  officers	  reserve	  the	  right	  to,	  “examine	  the	  physical	  aspects	  of	  a	  phone	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  used	  as	  a	  weapon-­‐-­‐say,	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  razor	  blade	  hidden	  between	  the	  phone	  and	   its	  case.”	   (ibid.)	  Chief	   Justice	  Roberts	  also	  made	   the	  point	   that	   today	  most	  phones	  automatically	  lock	  after	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time.	  Thus,	  once	  the	  phone	  is	  locked,	  the	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data	  becomes	  encrypted	  so	  searching	  would	  be	  near	  impossible.	  Consider	  the	  details	  of	  the	  San	  Bernadino	  case,	   in	  which	  a	  phone	  required	  a	  PIN	   for	  decryption	  because	   it	  had	  been	  powered	  down,	  encrypting	  all	  of	  the	  data	  inside	  it.	  Once	  a	  phone	  has	  become	  encrypted,	  the	  owner	  would	  need	  to	  provide	  the	  password	  or	  fingerprint	  to	  unlock	  the	  phone.32	   	   Another	  important	  distinction	  to	  make	  is	  that	  cell-­‐phones	  today	  are	  not	  comparable	  to	  cell-­‐phones	  a	  mere	  few	  years	  ago.	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  points	  out,	  “Cell	  phones	  differ	  in	  both	   a	   quantitative	   and	   a	   qualitative	   sense	   from	   other	   objects	   that	  might	   be	   kept	   on	   an	  arrestee’s	   person.	   The	   term	   ‘cell	   phone’	   is	   itself	   misleading	   shorthand;	   many	   of	   these	  devices	   are	   in	   fact	  minicomputers	   that	   also	   happen	   to	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   be	   used	   as	   a	  telephone.	  They	  could	  just	  as	  easily	  be	  called	  cameras,	  video	  players,	  rolodexes,	  calendars,	  tape	   recorders,	   libraries,	   diaries,	   albums,	   televisions,	   maps,	   or	   newspapers.”	   (ibid.)	  Computers,	   and	   cell	   phones,	   are	   able	   to	   consolidate	  massive	   amounts	   of	   data	   in	   a	   small	  device.	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  acknowledged,	  “Before	  cell	  phones,	  a	  search	  of	  a	  person	  was	  limited	   by	   physical	   realities	   and	   tended	   as	   a	   general	  matter	   to	   constitute	   only	   a	   narrow	  intrusion	  on	  privacy.”	  (ibid.)	  However,	  advancement	  in	  technologies	  means	  that	  a	  search	  of	  a	  person	  can	  now	   intrude	  on	   incredible	   intimate	  details	  of	   their	  private	   lives.	  Because	  of	  this,	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  needs	   to	  consider	  computers,	  or	  any	  data	  storage	  device,	  as	  just	   that-­‐-­‐a	  data	   storage	  device.	   Chief	   Justice	  Roberts	  quantified	   this	  data	  by	  noting,	   “the	  current	   top-­‐selling	   smartphone	   has	   a	   standard	   capacity	   of	   sixteen	   gigabytes	   (and	   is	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available	  with	  up	  to	  sixty-­‐four	  gigabytes).	  Sixteen	  gigabytes	  translates	  to	  millions	  of	  pages	  of	  text,	  thousands	  of	  photos,	  or	  hundreds	  of	  videos.”33	   So	  how	  do	  the	  storage	  capacities	  of	  computers	  relate	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment?	  It	  deals	  most	  heavily	  with	  the	  association	  of	  privacy.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts,	  a	  cell	   phone	   today	   is	   a	   mini	   computer.	   This	   mini-­‐computer	   is	   able	   to	   collect	   an	   immense	  amount	  of	  personal	  data	  and	  contain	  it	  all	  in	  one	  device.	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  noted,	  “The	  sum	  of	  an	   individual’s	  private	   life	   can	  be	   reconstructed	   through	  a	   thousand	  photographs	  labeled	  with	  dates,	  locations,	  and	  descriptions;	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  of	  a	  photograph	  or	  two	   of	   loved	   ones	   tucked	   into	   a	   wallet.”	   Additionally,	   the	   phone	   has	   the	   capability	   of	  containing	  data	  dating	  back	  to	  before	  the	  phone	  was	  even	  purchased.	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  phrased	   it	   best	   when	   he	   explained	   “a	   person	   might	   carry	   in	   his	   pocket	   a	   slip	   of	   paper	  reminding	  him	  to	  call	  Mr.	  Jones;	  he	  would	  not	  carry	  a	  record	  of	  all	  his	  communications	  with	  Mr.	  Jones	  for	  the	  past	  several	  months,	  as	  would	  routinely	  be	  kept	  on	  a	  phone.”	  (ibid.)	   The	   data	   that	   is	   stored	   and	   found	   on	   cell	   phones	   is	   also	  much	  more	   explicit	   than	  what	  would	  traditionally	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  found	  during	  a	  physical	  search	  of	  a	  home.	  Chief	  Justice	   Roberts	   acknowledges	   that	   certain	   types	   of	   data	   are	   qualitatively	   different.	   For	  example,	   “an	   internet	   search	   and	  browsing	  history...can	  be	   found	  on	  an	   Internet-­‐enabled	  phone	  and	  could	  reveal	  an	  individual's	  private	  interests	  or	  concerns”,	  and	  “historic	  location	  information	   is	   a	   standard	   feature	   on	  many	   smartphones	   and	   can	   reconstruct	   someone’s	  specific	  movements	  down	  to	  the	  minute,	  not	  only	  around	  town	  but	  also	  within	  a	  particular	  building.”	   (ibid.)	   This	   abundant	   amount	   of	   sheer	   personal	   data	   led	   the	   Court	   to	   state,	  “Allowing	   the	  police	   to	   scrutinize	   such	   records	  on	   a	   routine	  basis	   is	   quite	  different	   from	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allowing	  them	  to	  search	  a	  personal	  item	  or	  two	  in	  the	  occasional	  case.”34	  Finally,	  the	  issue	  with	  treating	  a	  cell	  phone	  as	  something	  as	  casual	  as	  a	  wallet	  or	  a	  crumpled	  up	  cigarette	  box	  is	  best	   summed	  up	  by	  Chief	   Justice	  Roberts	  when	  he	  stated,	   “Indeed,	  a	   cell	  phone	  search	  would	   typically	  expose	   to	   the	  government	   far	  more	   than	   the	  most	  exhaustive	  search	  of	  a	  house:	  A	  phone	  not	  only	  contains	  in	  digital	  form	  many	  sensitive	  records	  previously	  found	  in	  the	  home;	  it	  also	  contains	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  private	  information	  never	  found	  in	  a	  home	  in	  any	  form—	  unless	  the	  phone	  is.”	  (ibid.) The	   search	   incident	   to	   arrest	   principle	  was	   designed	  with	   good	   intentions.	   It	  was	  designed	   to	   protect	   people	   and	   ensure	   the	   justice	   system	   could	   not	   be	   corrupted	   by	   the	  destruction	   of	   evidence.	   It	   is	   still	   possible	   to	   maintain	   the	   integrity	   of	   this	   principle	   by	  extending	  it	  to	  the	  philosophy	  behind	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.	  The	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  acknowledged	  in	  Riley	  v.	  California	  that	  cell	  phones,	  or	  mini-­‐computers,	  need	  to	  be	  handled	   differently	   under	   our	   current	   legal	   system.	   The	   same	   must	   be	   said	   for	   when	  computers	   are	   seized	   and	   searched	   under	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.	   The	   restrictions	   and	  specifics	  of	  the	  warrant	  need	  to	  be	  different	  than	  that	  of	  traditional	  search	  warrants	  given	  the	  advanced	  technological	  nature	  of	  computers.	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VI. Plain	  View	  Doctrine	  	  
 	   One	   of	   the	   many	   hidden	   surprises	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   is	   the	   Plain	   View	  Doctrine.	  There	  are	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement	  for	  searches.	  If	  someone	  gives	  consent	   to	   a	   search,	   the	   search	   can	   take	   place.	   According	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   plain	   view	  doctrine	   in	   Coolidge	   v.	   New	   Hampshire,	   “if	   an	   officer	   is	   lawfully	   present,	   he	   may	   seize	  objects	   that	   are	   in	   ‘plain	   view’.	   However,	   the	   officer	   must	   have	   had	   probable	   cause	   to	  believe	   that	   the	   objects	   are	   contraband.”35	  For	   example,	   if	   a	   police	   officer	   has	   a	   search	  warrant	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   dead	   body,	   and	   while	   looking	   around	   the	   house	   finds	   a	  greenhouse	  full	  of	  illegally	  growing	  marijuana	  plants,	  this	  would	  fall	  under	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine.	  However,	  how	  should	   this	  apply	   to	   the	  search	  of	  a	  computer?	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	  that	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine	  was	  not	  created	  as	  yet	  another	  means	  for	  the	  government	  to	   search	   private	   homes.	   Instead,	   this	   was	   created	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   sometimes	  contraband	   can	   simply	   just	  be	  happened	  upon.	  Given	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   is	   something	   that	  happens	   rarely	   and	   isn't	   something	   that	   is	   explicitly	   searched	   for,	   when	   dealing	   with	  computers	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  to	  fall	  under	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine,	  files	  must	  be	  on	  the	  home	  screen	  or	  another	  location	  that	  is	  obvious.	   Additionally,	   if	   files	   and	   folders	   are	   being	   searched	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  previously	  mentioned	   stipulations,	   including	   the	  use	  of	   a	   third	  party	  and	   file	   type	   filters,	  then	  the	  file	  name	  or	  the	  content	  of	  the	  file	  can	  trigger	  the	  discovery.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  file	  type	  is	  what	  should	  be	  searched	  for	  rather	  than	  merely	  relying	  on	  the	  file	  extension.	  However,	  when	   dealing	  with	   the	   plain	   view	   doctrine,	  we	  must	   only	   rely	   on	  what	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Coolidge	  v.	  New	  Hampshire	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naturally	   be	   seen	   when	   investigating	   and	   searching	   for	   something.	   If	   while	   searching	   a	  privately	  owned	  residence	   for	  evidence	  of	   tax	  evasion,	   it	  would	  be	   fair	   to	  search	  through	  any	   financial	   documents.	   However,	   if	   while	   searching	   through	   these	   documents	   it	   is	  discovered	   that	   embezzlement	   has	   also	   occurred,	   then	   that	   is	   fair	   game.	   Similarly,	   if	   the	  image	   files	  on	  computers	  are	  being	  searched	   for	  child	  pornography,	  and	  photos	  of	   illegal	  drugs	  appear,	  then	  this	  too	  would	  be	  fair	  game	  and	  fall	  under	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine.	  File	  names	  are	  also	   important,	  and	  should	  also	  serve	  as	   triggers.	  For	  example,	   if	   the	  searcher	  finds	  a	  file	  labeled	  “Child_Porn.png”	  then	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  this	  could	  possibly	  contain	   illegal	  content.	  This	  occurs	  more	  often	  than	  one	  would	  think.	  Recently	   it	  was	  discovered	  that	  the	  bombers	  who	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  March	  22nd,	  2016	  attack	  in	  Brussels	  had	  a	   folder	  on	  his	   laptop	   titled	   “Target”.36	  As	   the	  plain	  view	  doctrine	   functions	  with	  physical	  searches,	  any	  discovered	  content	  outside	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  warrant	  must	  be	  something	   that	   only	   a	   third	   party	   search	   would	   have	   discovered	   and	   deemed	   possibly	  illegal.	   
 	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Brooks-­‐Pollock,	  2016	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VII. Future	  Applications	  	  
 	   The	   future	   of	   technological	   advancement	   is	   limitless.	   With	   computers	   becoming	  more	  portable	  and	  containing	  higher	  storage	  capabilities,	  privacy	  is	  becoming	  harder	  and	  harder	  to	  maintain.	  Consider	  cloud	  storage:	  we	  are	  now	  able	  to	  store	  our	  personal	  digital	  data	  on	  servers	  that	  are	  physically	  not	  owned	  by	  us.	  At	  that	  point,	  how	  does	  the	  law	  claim	  ownership	  if	  someone	  does	  not	  physically	  own	  the	  data?	  Additionally,	  cloud	  storage	  can	  be	  international.	  People	  can	  store	  information	  on	  servers	  in	  different	  countries,	  thousands	  of	  miles	   away.	   How	   then,	   can	   our	   legal	   system	  maneuver	   that?	   In	   Riley	   v.	   California,	   Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  discusses	  the	  future	  of	  technology	  and	  states,	   “Mobile	  application	  software	  on	  a	  cell	  phone,	  or	  “apps,”	  offer	  a	  range	  of	  tools	  for	  managing	  detailed	  information	  about	  all	  aspects	  of	  a	  person’s	  life.	  There	  are	   apps	   for	   Democratic	   Party	   news	   and	   Republican	   Party	   news;	   apps	   for	  alcohol,	   drug,	   and	   gambling	   addictions;	   apps	   for	   sharing	   prayer	   requests;	  apps	  for	  tracking	  pregnancy	  symptoms;	  apps	  for	  planning	  your	  budget;	  apps	  for	   every	   conceivable	  hobby	  or	  pastime;	   apps	   for	   improving	  your	   romantic	  life.	  There	  are	  popular	  apps	  for	  buying	  or	  selling	  just	  about	  anything,	  and	  the	  records	   of	   such	   transactions	   may	   be	   accessible	   on	   the	   phone	   indefinitely.	  There	  are	  over	  a	  million	  apps	  available	  in	  each	  of	  the	  two	  major	  app	  stores;	  the	  phrase	  “there’s	  an	  app	   for	   that”	   is	  now	  part	  of	   the	  popular	   lexicon.	  The	  average	   smartphone	  user	  has	   installed	  33	  apps,	  which	   together	   can	   form	  a	  revealing	  montage	  of	  the	  user’s	  life.”37	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Riley	  v.	  California	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With	   information	   being	   shared	   freely	   and	   abundantly,	   the	   lines	   upon	   which	   the	   Fourth	  Amendment	  was	  originally	  based	  on	  are	  blurring.	  As	  Justice	  Alito	  stated	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Jones,	   “in	   circumstances	   involving	   dramatic	   technological	   change,	   the	   best	   solution	   to	  privacy	  concerns	  may	  be	  legislative.”38	   	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  United	  States	  v.	  Jones	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VIII. Conclusion	  	  
 Technology	  is	  advancing	  at	  a	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  law	  has	  simply	  not	  been	  able	  to	  keep	  up	  with.	  Our	  lives	  and	  daily	  routines	  are	  completely	  integrated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  computers,	  including	  laptops,	  tablets,	  smartphones,	  and	  even	  smart	  watches.	  An	  average	  smartphone	  today	  has	   the	  capacity	   to	  hold	  all	  of	  one’s	  emails,	   contacts,	  messages,	  and	  can	  even	   track	  one’s	  physical	  location	  through	  the	  GPS.	  In	  a	  way,	  computers	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  contain	  all	   of	   the	   aspects	   that	   compose	   our	   life	   in	   digital	   format.	   Because	   of	   this,	   it	   is	   of	   utmost	  urgency	   and	   importance	   that	   the	   courts	   begin	   addressing	   the	   impact	   technology	   has	   on	  laws	  that	  were	  created	  at	  a	  time	  where	  something	  like	  a	  smartphone	  was	  unimaginable.	  In	  particular,	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   needs	   to	   be	   restructured	   in	   order	   to	   accommodate	  searches	   of	   computers.	   The	   existing	   legal	   background	   has	   shown	   how	   searches	   and	  seizures	  have	  adapted	   to	  new	   technology	  and	  new	  spaces.	  These	  precedent	   setting	  cases	  have	  pushed	  the	  boundaries	  on	  what	  both	  parties	  can	  legally	  do.	  	  Given	   the	   importance	   of	   computers	   today,	   the	   courts	   must	   begin	   examining	   and	  determining	  the	  role	  the	  constitution	  and	  Fourth	  Amendment	  plays	  in	  computer	  searches.	  In	   summary,	   there	   are	   several	   aspects	   of	   the	   search	  warrant	   that	  must	   hold	   in	   order	   to	  conduct	   a	   constitutional	   and	   fair	   search:	   (1)	   When	   dealing	   with	   searching	   computers,	  search	  warrants	  must	  be	  explicit	   in	  exactly	  what	  they	  are	  searching	  for	  with	  reference	  to	  content	   and	   file/data	   types;	   (2)	   The	   scope	   of	   the	   search	   warrant	   needs	   to	   be	   specified	  before	  the	  warrant	  is	  executed;	  (3)	  The	  search	  warrant	  should	  specify	  a	  time	  limit	  for	  how	  long	  a	  computer	  can	  remain	   in	   the	  court’s	  possession;	   (4)	  All	   searches	  of	   computers	  and	  the	   analysis	   on	   the	   data	  must	   be	   conducted	   by	   a	   third-­‐party	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   bias;	   (5)	  
	   43	  
Because	  computers	  do	  not	  present	  an	   inherent	  physical	  danger,	   they	  cannot	  be	  searched	  under	  the	  search	  incident	  to	  arrest	  principle;	  and	  (6)	  As	  the	  plain	  view	  doctrine	  functions	  with	  physical	  searches,	  any	  discovered	  content	  outside	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  warrant	  must	  be	  something	   that	   only	   a	   third	   party	   search	   would	   have	   discovered	   and	   deemed	   possibly	  illegal.	  With	   these	   restrictions	   and	   stipulations	   put	   in	   place,	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   can	  adequately	  and	  fairly	  be	  applied	  to	  computer	  searches	  today.	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